UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

7-19-2013

State v. Bolan Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40458

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Bolan Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40458" (2013). Not Reported. 1153.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1153

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 40458
Ada Co. Case No.
CR-2011-18000

)

CHRISTINA ALICIA BOLAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________

)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA

HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DENNIS BENJAMIN
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
303 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000

DAPHNEJ.HUANG
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................4
I.

II.

Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred
By Not Ordering Another Psychological Evaluation,
Under I.C. § 19-2522 .................................................................. 4
A.

lntroduction ...................................................................... 4

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... .4

C.

Invited Error Doctrine Applies .......................................... 5

D.

Bolan Cannot Establish Fundamental Error .................... 6

E.

Bolan Cannot Establish Manifest Disregard .................... 8

Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred
Or Abused Its Discretion By Inadequately Considering
Bolan's Mental Health When It Imposed A Sentence
Of Six Years With Two Years Fixed ......................................... 10
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 10

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 11

C.

The Record Supports That The Sentencing
Court's And Bolan's Silence Regarding
Bolan's Mental Health Was A Reasonable
Rejection Of Mental Health As A Determinative
Factor At Sentencing ..................................................... 11

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 (2011) ........................................ 11
State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,229 P.3d 1179 (2010) ................... .4, 5, 6, 9
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,264 P.3d 935 (2011) .............................. 11, 12, 14
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ........................................ 4, 5
State v. Quintana, 2013 WL 2382526 (Ct. App. 2013) ........................... 11, 12, 14
State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 266 P.3d 1211 (Ct. App. 2011) ...................... 5, 6
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (Ct. App. 2002) ................ 11, 12, 14
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011) ..................................... 10

STATUTES
I.C. § 19-2522 .............................................................................................. passim
I.C. § 19-2523 ......................................................................................... 11, 12, 13

RULES
I.C.R. 32(d) .............................................................................................................

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christina Alicia Bolan appeals from her judgment of conviction on guilty
plea to felony possession of a controlled substance. Bolan argues the district
court erred by failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation, and by
failing to consider Bolan's mental health at sentencing.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Christina Alicia Bolan with felony and misdemeanor
counts of possessing a controlled substance, and a misdemeanor count of
possessing drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp. 6-7, 23-24.)

In March 2012, Bolan

completed a guilty plea advisory and form, and the district court attempted to
take her guilty plea in court. (R., pp. 55-62; see 3/7/12 Tr.) However, based on
Bolan's demeanor in court, the judge ordered the marshal to take Bolan for a
drug test that came back positive for methamphetamine. (3/7/12 Tr., p. 10, L. 8
- p. 11, L. 8.) Explaining that the court cannot take a guilty plea when Bolan is
under the influence, the court set the matter over one week. (3/7/12 Tr., p. 11,
Ls. 14-19.)
The following week, the district court accepted Bolan's guilty plea and
ordered a presentence investigation report.

(See 3/14/12 Tr.)

At Bolan's

sentencing hearing, the district court ordered a term of six years with two years
fixed, but retained jurisdiction and recommended placement in the Correctional
Alternative Placement Program followed by drug court. (R., pp. 64-67.)
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Less than six months later, Bolan came before the district court again in a
rider review hearing.

(See 10/17/12 Tr.; R., p. 73.)

The APSI reported that

Bolan was dishonest in her programming homework, was screened as high-risk
in areas associated with criminal behavior, was removed from her GED and
Moral Reconation Therapy programs, and failed her relapse prevention program.
(PSI, pp. 110-112.) The APSI thus recommended relinquishment of jurisdiction,
and the state asked that the court follow the recommendation.

(PSI, p. 110;

10/17/12 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 15-17.) Bolan did not deny anything from the APSI, but
requested the opportunity to participate in drug court, and asked that the court
not impose sentence. (10/17/12 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 8-25; p. 37, Ls. 1-11.) The district
court concluded Bolan was not appropriate for drug court, and relinquished
jurisdiction, executing Bolan' sentence of six years with two years fixed.
(10/17/12 Tr., p. 37, Ls. 16-17; p. 39, Ls. 6-14; R., pp. 74-76.)
appealed. (R., pp. 78-80.)
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Bolan timely

ISSUES
Bolan states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the court err by failing to sua sponte order a
psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522?

2.

Did the court err by failing to consider Christina's mental
illness when fashioning the sentence?

(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Bolan failed to show the trial court erred by not ordering another
psychological evaluation, under I.C. § 19-2522?

2.

Has Bolan failed to show the trial court erred or abused its discretion by
inadequately considering Bolan's mental health when it imposed a
sentence of six years with two years fixed?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred By Not Ordering Another
Psychological Evaluation, Under I.C. § 19-2522

A

Introduction
On this appeal, Bolan asserts for the first time that the trial court's failure

to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation violated I.C. § 19-2522.
According to Bolan, information before the court demonstrated that her mental
health was a significant factor that should have been addressed at sentencing.
As discussed below, Bolan fails to satisfy her burden on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
Generally, issues must be raised before the trial court to be considered on

appeal.

State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).

However, an exception applies to criminal defendants deprived of due process
through fundamental error. lg.; State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 820, 229
P.3d 1179, 1182 (2010). Where the asserted error is the trial court's failure to
order a psychological evaluation for sentencing purposes, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has held that "the defendant must demonstrate ... the sentencing court
manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32." Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at
822, 229 P.3d at 1184.
The issue whether the fundamental error standard or manifest disregard
standard applies is currently before the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Carter,
#39927 (oral argument presented 6/12/2013, decision pending), and State v.
Clinton, #40461 (oral argument set for 8/27/2013). Under the fundamental error
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standard, an appellant must demonstrate: (1) violation of an unwaived
constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear and obvious without need to further
develop the record; and (3) that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (2010). The manifest
disregard standard is essentially free review of the district court's action or
inaction by the appellate court, in light of the record. See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho
817, 229 P.3d 1179.
The state here asserts, as it has in Carter and Clinton, that the
fundamental error standard applies.

But under either standard, Bolan cannot

satisfy her burden on appeal.

C.

Invited Error Doctrine Applies
As an initial matter, Bolan is precluded from asserting error under the

doctrine of invited error.

See State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106, 114, 266 P.3d

1211, 1219 n. 4 (Ct. App. 2011). That doctrine estops a party from asserting
error when her own conduct induces the commission of the error. Id. In other
words, an alleged error "consented to or acquiesced in" is not reversible.

Id.

The record here establishes that Bolan consented to or acquiesced in the
omission of an additional psychological evaluation, now claimed as error.
At Bolan's plea hearing, the district court announced it would order a
presentence report; neither party requested an evaluation for sentencing
purposes.

(3/14/12 Tr., p. 14, L. 5 - p. 16, L. 9.) The court's colloquy with

counsel and Bolan at the plea hearing concerned bond and the importance of
Bolan remaining "clean and sober." (Id.) At sentencing, the district court asked,
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"Does either party contend there should be additional investigation or evaluation
of the defendant before sentencing?" to which both parties responded, "no."

(4/25/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 12-16.) The PSI, prepared for sentencing, referenced
Bolan's yet-unavailable psychological evaluation from January 201i by clinical
psychologist David Delawyer.

(PSI, pp. 11, 81-100.)

An APSI filed after

sentencing, but before relinquishment of jurisdiction attached several previously
unavailable medical records, including Bolan's 2012 Psychological Evaluation.
(See PSI, p. 77.)
Bolan had every opportunity to request another psychological evaluation,
and was invited to make such a request at sentencing. By actively declining to
request an evaluation at any time before her appeal, Bolan invited the error she
now argues warrants reversal. See Rollins, 152 Idaho at 114, 266 P.3d at 1219
n. 4. Under Rollins, this Court must reject her argument.
D.

Bolan Cannot Establish Fundamental Error
Even if this Court finds the invited error doctrine does not apply, Bolan

cannot establish fundamental error because there is no constitutional right to a
psychological evaluation for sentencing purposes. See Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at

822, 229 P.3d at 1184 (psychological evaluation need not be ordered in every
case where defendant claims mental illness; decision to order it is in sentencing

1

Although the PSI mistakenly lists the evaluation's date as 2010, the evaluation
indicates it was completed January 2012.
6

court's discretion). Indeed, Bolan makes no argument that she had such a right,
or that the sentencing court violated a constitutional right by not ordering a
psychological evaluation before sentencing. Thus, the first two prongs of Perry
are not met.
If the Court were to consider the third prong of Perry. which it need not,
Bolan cannot show her proceedings were affected by the court's failure to order
a psychological evaluation.

As evidenced in the transcripts, the focus of the

court's and Bolan's concerns throughout the court proceedings was Bolan's drug
problem.

(See 3/7/12 Tr.; 3/14/12 Tr.; 4/25/12 Tr.; 10/17/12 Tr.) Memorably,

when the court first attempted to take Bolan's plea, the court sent Bolan for a
random drug test that showed she was positive for methamphetamine. (3/7/12
Tr., p. 10, L. 8 - p. 11, L. 19.)
thought a lot about this case.

In imposing sentence, the court advised, "I
I've read this very carefully . . . ," and then

commented on the difficulty of recovery from drug addiction. (4/25/12 Tr., p. 25,
Ls. 22-23; p. 27, L. 22 - p. 28, L. 10.) The record, carefully read by the court,
included Bolan's PSI which discussed her recent psychological evaluation and its
contents, despite not attaching the record. (See PSI, pp. 1-14.)
At her rider review hearing, the record included Bolan's January 2012
psychological evaluation. (PSI, pp. 81-100.) The district court's focus did not
shift from Bolan's substance abuse problem.

(See 10/17/12 Tr.)

More

importantly, Bolan did not mention or request mental health services, but asked
for drug court.

(10/17/12 Tr., p. 36, L. 8 - p. 37, L. 1.) Highlighting Bolan's

inability to be honest through her minimal programming, the court denied Bolan's
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request, saying, "the only reason you want to do drug court is you want to get
out. I don't really think you really want to change your behavior." (10/17/12 Tr.,
p. 37, L. 23 - p. 39, L. 5.) The court found drug court inappropriate, but said,
"Clearly you're in need of some correctional treatment and that can only be
accomplished within the Department of Corrections. I am going to recommend
the therapeutic community. I think that would be good for you, but it's going to
be dependent entirely on your behavior." (10/17/12 Tr., p. 39, L. 20 - p. 40, L.
2.)

There is no indication the district court's sentence would have differed had
an additional psychological evaluation been before the court. Accordingly, Bolan
fails to satisfy any of the prongs for fundamental error.

E.

Bolan Cannot Establish Manifest Disregard
If this Court were to apply the manifest disregard standard, Bolan still

could not satisfy her burden on appeal.

Bolan contends the court manifestly

disregarded I.C.R. 32 by failing to adequately consider Bolan's mental health, as
would have been shown through another psychological evaluation, which was
required under I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.)
Section 19-2522 provides, "If there is reason to believe the mental
condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good
cause shown, the court shall appoint" a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to
evaluate and report on defendant's mental condition.

I.C. § 19-2522(1).

However, "[a] psychological evaluation is not required in every case where the
defendant claims some mental illness or disability," rather, whether to order an
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evaluation "lies within the sentencing court's discretion" as provided in I.C.R.
32(d).

Jockumsen, 148 Idaho at 822, 229 P.3d at 1184 (citations omitted).

Ultimately, "A district court's election not to order a psychological evaluation will
be upheld on appeal if the record can support a finding that there was no reason
to believe a defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at
sentencing or if the information already before the court adequately met the

requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3)."

k!.

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Here, the record establishes that all pertinent information of Bolan's
mental health concerns was already before the court at sentencing. (See PSI,
pp. 11, 36-45 (GAIN eval.), 59, 62, 67-72, 81-100.) The 2012 evaluation was
before the court before its decision to execute the sentence of six years with two
years fixed.

(PSI, pp. 77, 81-100.)

Indeed, the circumstances of this case

illustrate the logic and practicality of applying judicial discretion to the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, and thus avoid costs and effort for unnecessary
evaluations.
Bolan argues that her January 2012 evaluation did not adequately
analyze "the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment, or a
consideration of the risk of danger'' Bolan posed to the public if at large, as
required in I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Although the evaluation
does not include subheadings explicitly addressing these topics, it does include
detailed discussion of Bolan's troubled past, analysis of relevant mental health
concerns, and diagnoses. (PSI, pp. 81-100.) The evaluation provided abundant
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information about Bolan's mental health under I.C. § 19-2522, for the court to
determine a proper sentence.
Further, although the statute requires that the evaluation address
identified factors, it imposes no requirement on the court in weighing those
factors. I.C. § 19-2522. Bolan offers no explanation how another evaluation, if
more complete under I.C. § 19-2522, would have impacted the outcome of her
sentencing.

Stated another way,

Bolan fails to link the court's oral

admonishments and sentence with a supposed lack of information about risks
and benefits of mental health treatment or non-treatment, or about Bolan's threat
to the public. The transcripts reveal no uncertainty by the court, necessitating
Bolan's further evaluation.

Absent evidence the court ignored a need for

additional evaluation, Bolan fails to show manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32.

11.
Bolan Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred Or Abused Its Discretion By
Inadequately Considering Bolan's Mental Health When It Imposed A Sentence
Of Six Years With Two Years Fixed
A.

Introduction
The appellate court will not disturb a sentence that is within statutory limits

absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875, 253
P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). Bolan does not assert that her sentence
exceeded statutory limits, or that it is excessive.

However, Bolan appears to

argue the sentencing court abused its discretion - or at least erred - by not
considering her mental condition. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 5, 9-11.)
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B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court considers whether

the district court (1) was aware its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the
scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable law, and (3) reached its
decision through exercise of reason.

State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264

P.3d 935, 941 (2011 ). A defendant challenging her sentence must show it is
unreasonable under the facts of the case, considering the objectives of societal
protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Quintana, 2013
WL 2382526 at *3 (Ct. App. 2013). The appellate court independently reviews
the record, examining the nature of the offense, and the offender's character.
State v. Delling. 152 Idaho 122,132,267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) (citation omitted).
Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is excessive, the
appellate court will not disturb it. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d
935, 941 (2011) (citation omitted).

C.

The Record Supports That The Sentencing Court's And Bolan's Silence
Regarding Bolan's Mental Health Was A Reasonable Rejection Of Mental
Health As A Determinative Factor At Sentencing
Arguing this case should be remanded for resentencing, Bolan cites State

v. Quintana, 2013 WL 2382526 (Ct. App. 2013), State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
267 P.3d 935 (2011), and State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 P.3d 472 (Ct. App.
2002). Under those cases, "if the defendant's mental condition is a significant
issue," the sentencing court must weigh defendant's mental condition, looking to
factors set out in I.C. § 19-2523. Quintana, at *3 (citing Miller, 151 Idaho at 834,

11

264 P.3d at 941); Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476.

Those factors

include:
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional
impairment;
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required;
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the
public, if at large, or the absence of such risk;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
at the time of the offense charged.
I.C. § 19-2523(1 )(a)-(f).
Section 19-2523 "does not require that a defendant's mental condition be
the controlling factor at sentencing, nor does it require the district court to
specifically reference all of the factors."

kl at *4

(citing Miller, 151 Idaho at 836,

264 P.3d at 943; Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476). "The record need
only show that the court adequately considered the substance of the factors in
arriving at its sentencing decisions." Strand, 137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476;
see also Quintana, at *3; Miller, 151 Idaho at 836,264 P.3d at 943.
The courts in Quintana, Miller, and Strand each concluded there was no
abuse of discretion in failing to adequately consider the defendants' mental
health. Quintana, at *5; Miller, 151 Idaho at 837, 264 P.3d at 944; Strand, 137
Idaho at 462, 50 P.3d at 477. Similarly, the record in this case fails to support
that the sentencing court failed to adequately consider Bolan's mental health.
The record shows instead that the sentencing court sufficiently considered the
substance of I.C. § 19-2523(1) in making its sentencing decisions.
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As already discussed, the court's and both parties' chief concern at
sentencing was Bolan's drug problem. (See 3/7/12 Tr.; 3/14/12 Tr.; 4/25/12 Tr.;
10/17/12 Tr.) The sentencing court asked counsel if either party believed there
should be additional investigation or evaluation of Bolan before sentencing, and
both responded, "no." (4/25/12 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 12-16.) The court also stated on
the record that it had thought a lot about the case and reviewed it very carefully.
(4/25/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 22-23.) At her rider review hearing, Bolan's request was
for drug court. (10/17/12 Tr., p. 36, L. 8 - p. 37, L. 1.) The record does not
support Bolan's claim that the evidence of her mental health was simply ignored.
Rather, the court's and Bolan's silence on the topic speaks to the implicit
consensus that mental health concerns were not significant given Bolan's
substance abuse problems.
Also, although the court and parties were silent as to Bolan's mental
health, the record was not. The 2012 psychological evaluation, PSI, and APSI
address Bolan's mental health and substance abuse concerns in detail. (PSI,
pp. 11, 81-100, 111-15.) Applying the information in those reports to the factors
in I.C. § 19-2523, it is perfectly reasonable that the court and Bolan identified
substance abuse - not mental health - as the pertinent concern at sentencing. It
was Bolan's substance abuse, not mental illness, causing her functional
impairment, affecting her ability to conform her conduct to the law, and creating a
risk of danger to others. See I.C. § 19-2523(1). The record does not support
that the sentencing court ignored the substance of I.C. § 19-2523(1).
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It is true that, in Quintana, Miller, and Strand, the sentencing courts had
explicitly addressed the defendants' mental conditions and had referenced
provider evaluations. Quintana, at *5; Miller, 151 Idaho at 837, 264 P.3d at 944;
Strand, 137 Idaho at 462, 50 P.3d at 477. But those decisions stopped short of
requiring a sentencing court to do so.

Instead, they required only that the

sentencing court's consideration of mental health factors be adequate. Strand,
137 Idaho at 461, 50 P.3d at 476; Quintana, at *3; Miller, 151 Idaho at 836, 264
P.3d at 943.
In light of the facts of this case, Bolan has failed to establish that the
district court's consideration of her mental health - about which Bolan herself
was utterly mute - was inadequate. Accordingly, Bolan has not shown an abuse
of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's order
imposing sentence and relinquishing jurisdiction.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2013.

D~~

Deputy Attorney Gen~
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